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Abstract. On the occasion of scholar and teacher, Algis Mickunas’ 80th birthday, 
I wish to recognize his particular essay, “Th e Global Intellectual and Self Worth,” by 
expanding on his insights. I have chosen to expand this article by selecting another 
teacher and his student, Confucius and Yan Hui. Th e examined situation of the grief 
suﬀ ered by Confucius upon the death of Yan Hui provides context to the meaning of life 
as self-worth and life worth living.
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Introduction
Th roughout the analects, Confucius describes the capacity for bereavement as 
an ethically valuable trait. Here Confucius’ own display of at the premature death of 
his beloved student Yan Hui is investigated as a model of meaning and signifi cance 
Joseph Pilotta. The Global Intellectual and Self Worth: a Criterion for the Cultural Sciences12
in a flourishing life. This display provides a valuable portrait, in situ, of the specific 
species of bereavement that Confucius sanctions and encourages. It likewise makes 
clear what role vulnerability to injury plays in the articulation of self-worth.
The model of philosophy evident in the analects is oriented toward offering 
practical instruction for daily life and its emphasis is upon making one’s way, negotiating 
a path. In this regard, Confucius functions as a wayfarer his counsel aimed at mapping 
a safe and efficacious passage through a variety of prosaic human experiences. Among 
these experiences, perhaps one of the most prominent is bereavement. To suffer the 
death of loved one, Confucius suggests, is a uniquely perilous area in the landscape 
of human life. To navigate this area requires a robust and careful understanding of 
bereavement and its significance in a life well-lived. n what follows, I wish to focus upon 
the counsel Confucius offers regarding loss and the way in which Confucius valorizes 
this emotional expression as a constituent of a flourishing life. 
Part of what makes a marker useful is its distinctiveness. While what is distinctive 
will often depend upon circumstance, there are some landmarks that, owing to their 
less transitory and less common character, function as substantially stable (not to say 
permanent) points of orientation. In Confucius’ lexicon, these are models of individuals 
who serve a dual function as both markers and examples of those who have reached 
their destination. They are akin to a city’s lights at night-visible from great distance 
and remarkable in their clarity and prominence on the horizon. Both Yan Hui and 
Confucius himself cut such a figure in the analects. In the case of Yan Hui this is evident 
from the way in which Confucius describes Yan Hui’s character as, above all, reliable. 
His constancy in pursuing self-cultivation serves to provide a model that, unlike the 
model of Zilu, for instance, can be counted on to provide reliable instruction. The 
model that is of most relevance here, however, is Confucius himself.
Compiled by Confucius’ students, the text of the analects is, in large measure, a 
vivid and descriptive account of the character of Confucius. In addition to recording 
the words of Confucius, it offers superficially incidental details about his comportment 
and behavior in a variety of circumstances. It describes Confucius’ habits while 
dining1: his gait in the presence of mourners (e.g., an. 9.10, 10.25), and his physical 
1 The text that is often considered our most reliable source for Confucius’ thought, the Analects, 
will be my focus in what follows. Though perhaps more dependable than other sources using 
the voice of Confucius, the Analects itself is not, however, without problems. A collection of 
what are ostensibly Confucius’ statements, his conversations with his students, and, in part, 
simply a record of his activities and comportment, it contains many passages that scholars 
identify as problematic and that are suspected to be later interpolations. There is, at present, 
little consensus about these textual issues. Though I will be sensitive to these concerns, I propose 
to treat the Analects as a narrative and discuss the Confucius who emerges as the protagonist 
of this narrative. I will thus be less concerned with assessing the historical authenticity of the 
received text of the Analects and the image of Confucius it offers than with discerning whether 
a consistent and coherent therapy for the sorrow of bereavement may be discovered there.
-- Because many of Confucius’ claims are given as responses to particular interlocutors, 
understanding them requires that they be treated as assertions informed by the context 
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posture in a variety of contexts (e.g., an. 10.19, 10.24, 10.26). The text thus functions 
as both philosophy and something of a biography of Confucius. Yet the biographical, 
the display of Confucius’ persona, is philosophical, for it does what Confucius’ 
pronouncements alone cannot. Such details, are meant to be not understood but 
savored for such details do not simply breathe life into the ideas that Confucius offers. 
Rather, they display the ideas incarnate and, in so doing, marginalize the importance 
of ideas qua ideas in favor of the enjoyment of an atmosphere. The theme to which 
they insistently return the reader is that of wisdom as dynamic and evolving, an 
activity that resists sedimentation into abstract truth. The personae of individuals 
such as Yan Hui and particularly Confucius thus represent a way of being displayed 
does no and cannot serve, once and for all, to map a course. The deployment of 
models serves, rather, as “acts of evocation.”2 They instruct by manifesting, pointing 
rather than articulating. In this manner, they do not command intellectual assent, but 
lie on the horizon inviting appropriation and emulation.
Understanding Life
While Confucius’ reaction to Yan Hui’s death is embedded in the characters of 
each man and the relationship between them, there are features of Yan Hui’s death 
that permit a scope beyond this particular circumstance. There are, in short, psyche 
disposition towards death that Confucius brings to this encounter with loss that 
inform his reaction. While understanding Confucius’ response to Yan Hui’s death is 
in which they are given. To the degree that the text of the Analects permits, knowing the 
characters of Confucius’ interlocutors is necessary for a hermeneutically responsible reading. 
For Confucius’ replies are often measured. The message is not fixed but weighted against what 
the capabilities and character of the interlocutor will permit. Thus Confucius does not, for 
instance, settle upon singular definitions of terms but instead offers a variety of meanings, none 
of them exhaustive but each responding to a particular need and circumstance. It is for this 
reason that Confucius’ claims are best described as “suggestive.” Any apparent inconsistency 
between claims is resolved if they are treated not as attempts to hit a fixed target or establish a 
truth once and for all, but as deliberate and methodical efforts to indicate a direction for further 
inquiry. As such, they deploy a strategic ambiguity of sorts, inviting the reader to entertain a 
complex variety of meanings.
-- As Confucius’ practice of citing models from his own immediate acquaintance suggests, there 
is no permanent pantheon of unchanging models. To accept Confucius’ counsel is thus not to 
accept wholesale only those models he offers. For such an acceptance would neglect the way 
in which Confucius’ counsel resists reduction to a formula. To tread the path he describes 
would, rather, entail that, like Confucius, I look for models among those in my own immediate 
context and cultural framework. A vital “Confucianism” would be one that does not stop with 
the models of the Analects.
-- See, for example, Analects 10.8, 10.10, and 10.11. All references to the Analects (Lunyu) give 
chapter and passage number as they appear in the Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index 
Series No. 16: A Concordance to the Analects (and cited with an).
2 Hall, D. L., Ames, R.T., Thinking Through Confucius, SUNY Prees, 1987, p. 304.
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not reducible to a summary of attitudes, neither can his response be comprehended 
independently of them. Thus a brief examination of these suppositions is necessary 
before turning to the unique aspects of Yan Hui’s death and Confucius’ resultant 
grief upon the death of Yan Hui shares three important features with the death of 
Bo Niu, another of Confucius’ students.3 These features and Confucius’ grief at both 
of these deaths in turn reveal something of loss more broadly conceived. However it 
does point to what is a life worth living. The comparative may be that the unexamined 
life is not worth living, the unlived life is not worth examining. Confucius is clearly 
troubled in both cases, yet there are circumstances here that demarcate and delimit 
grief. It is not loss qua loss that troubles Confucius, but specific sorts of loss in 
particular contexts. Thus Confucius’ distress in each of these cases, results not from 
a “lack of nerve” in Confucius as he immediately and concretely encounters loss, but 
from the presence of specific circumstances that lend these deaths in particular a 
tragic character.4 Confucius does not conceive death, in a generic, abstract sense, to 
be tragic. It is, rather, a predictable and familiar aspect of natural and generational 
processes. While death itself is not tragic, however, particular deaths can be tragic 
insofar as they are waste. The sorrow of Confucius at the deaths of Yan Hui and Bo 
Niu is, in part, attributable to the way in which these deaths are wasteful. The waste of 
these deaths derives from the confluence of three principal features that they share. 
Both Yan Hui and Bo Niu are relatively young. They are also good people, leading 
lives in accordance with the Dao. Finally, both men died of illness rather than from 
any calamity resulting from their philosophical and virtuous practices. They did not, 
in short, give their lives for some higher aim.
While many insist that reconciliation to death requires an acceptance of its 
capacity to come when unexpected and strike with an indifference to age, Confucius’ 
reactions to the deaths of Yan Hui and Bo Niu imply a modified sense of this 
acceptance. While Confucius would accept the prudence of recognizing death’s 
capacity to take even the young, he does not equate reconciliation to death with 
a readiness to count the age of the dead a matter of indifference. The notion that 
a life can, no matter what its span, be “complete” is wholly alien to the Confucian 
worldview, a worldview in which the development of one’s character must, in some 
ways, be measured according to the opportunities that life affords. While one can, by 
dint of effort, achieve considerable successes regardless of station and stage in life,5 
there are certain aspects of human experience that are only afforded to those who 
have reached a certain age. Thus, though one may flourish whatever one’s allotted 
span, longevity is to be prized not for its own sake but for the way in which it permits 
3 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Death and Dying in the Analects,” in Confucian Spirituality. ed. Tu Wei-
ming, forthcoming.
4 Ibid.
5 See, for example, Analects 4.8, in which Confucius claims that if one hears the dao in the 
morning, one may die gladly in the evening.
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maturation of understanding and the expression of virtue across a full spectrum of 
possibilities that human life can offer. Time and experience are elements that permit 
enrichment otherwise unavailable. A commitment to pursue a life of cultivation 
and virtue is, in Confucius’ view, like the commitment to marriage. It presupposes 
not stasis but enriching change and, while one’s commitment to virtue may be 
accomplished in a moment, its fullest expression can only be afforded given time 
and opportunity. Because both Yan Hui and Bo Niu died young and as students, 
there were opportunities that they were unambiguously denied. The world would 
know them only as students and never as the teachers they might have become. They 
would never be husbands in long-lived marriages, grandfathers, or elders in their 
communities. The tragedy of their deaths and Confucius’ grief regarding their loss 
is thus in part attributable to the way in which the brevity of their lives represents 
possibilities unrealized. 
Persistence in life to no good end is not, clearly, the avoidance of tragedy. Being 
long-lived is only of value if those to whom time is granted make it so through their 
efforts. That Yan Hui and Bo Niu had characters that promised such effort makes 
their ends a sorrow and a waste of possibility.
While our modern idiom of death with dignity has great currency today, 
Confucius never used the term dignity, rather the term was also in the negative 
in the he would use indignity, humiliation, dishonor Therefore, the idiom with a 
Confucius framework is death to prevent indignity. The ethic of death with dignity is 
summarized in ancient and modern China as “rather be shattered vessel of jade rather 
than an unbroken piece of pottery” which means better to die in glory or dignity than 
to live or survive in disgust. In fact this is close to Kant’s idea on self-regard duty. 
We are in duty bound to take care of our life in and for itself, is not the greatest gift 
entrusted to our keeping and of which we must take care.. There are duties far greater 
than life and which can often be fulfilled only by sacrificing life if a man cannot 
preserve his life except by dishonoring his humanity; he ought rather to sacrifice it. 
(Lectures on ethics, 154–157) “Ren” and “yi” were not understood in Confucius but 
are manifest through types of relationship not through a universal duty but in general 
through interpersonal commitment, filial piety faithfulness in friendship. Yet, “Ren” 
and “yili” are realized by virtues of other regarding mortality, through concrete 
familial, social and political relationships. Confucius’ understanding of life is at once 
prosaic and profound. In affirming the sorrow we endure lives apparently cut short, 
Confucius implies that there is a certain justice in the rather commonplace tendency 
to view “untimely” deaths as a special sorrow. This sensibility is elevated beyond the 
merely commonplace by the way in which Confucius embeds it in the affirmation 
of specific values. Grief here is not blind outrage at the caprice of fate taking the 
young before their time. It is not, that is, rooted in the perception that fate has dealt 
with us unfairly. Rather, grief painfully consummates human values. Insofar as one 
recognizes one’s place in the world as intimately bound up in one’s relationships 
with others, insofar as the quality of one’s life is described according to the defining 
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character of these human intimacies, grief will emerge spontaneously as befitting the 
meaning of spontaneity or no action as the response to the loss of a relationship. Our 
desire to see those we love afforded a fullness of time and to be afforded a fullness 
of time in our relationships with them cannot but leave us vulnerable. However, to 
insulate ourselves against this vulnerability is to insulate ourselves from those aspects 
of life that most enrich. Grief is thus but an intensification of the values that invest 
human life with significance and meaning.
Confucius likens Yan Hui to a son and often recommends him as a model for 
emulation. When Yan Hui dies, Confucius’ reaction displays a sorrow so intense that 
even his students--presumably Yan Hui’s companions and friends--are taken aback. 
After Yan Hui’s death, Confucius refers to him in a way that suggests a persistent 
and abiding melancholy that exceeds simple nostalgia. The differences evident in the 
analects’ portrayal of Confucius’ reactions to the two deaths thus suggest that the 
appropriate response to loss resists summary in an account of rather abstract and 
general circumstances such as age, goodness, or manner of death. They suggest that, 
insofar as the reaction to loss is shaped according to circumstance, a more robust 
notion of “circumstance” than readily abstractable features is warranted. While 
general observations about timing and character provide a context for understanding, 
there is much here that they cannot explain. The nature of Confucius’ grief for Yan 
Hui seems rooted in something both more immediate and more elusive than an 
appeal to factual circumstances can capture. It is not a class of death that Confucius 
rues but the death of one man in particular. 
The Stupid/ Dull – Bland/ Colorless Man
Because Confucius’ dramatic reaction to Yan Hui’s death is situated in the relation 
that the two men enjoyed, the first step in entering into the atmosphere of Confucius’ 
grief is to investigate Yan Hui himself. Who is Yan Hui? Given the relative wealth of 
passages in the analects that concern or describe Yan Hui, this question is surprisingly 
difficult to answer. For Yan Hui, an individual whose death seemingly had the power 
to elicit Confucius’ greatest display of grief, often appears in the analects to be, frankly, 
remarkably unremarkable. Yan Hui, it is quite clear, is a good man. Yet relative to the 
dynamic, challenging, and even entertaining figures cut by many of Confucius’ other 
students, his very goodness apparently conspires to make him colorless, his personality 
tightly circumscribed by the moral lessons to which his activities and attitudes give rise. 
Indeed, goodness here seems to exercise a sort of tyranny over personality, obliterating 
any features or peculiarities of character that might compete for notice. Were it the 
case that the other students who people the analects were equally featureless, this 
might simply be attributed to the literary style of the text. However, this is not the case. 
Neither while the personalities and idiosyncratic characters of other students appear 
prominently, Yan Hui, it seems neither is unique nor only in being a rare species of 
good, but also in being somewhat insipid.
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To read the characterizations of Yan Hui in the analects as descriptions that, 
in some measure, mirror the man is to conclude that Yan Hui was often notable for 
what he, in contrast to Confucius’ others students, lacked. He had none of Zilu’s 
impetuousness, displaying instead a remarkable constancy (an. 6.7). Unlike Zigong, 
who was given to measuring and ranking others (an. 14.29), Yan Hui focuses on his 
own progress and shortcomings (although, notably, none of these shortcomings are 
specifically identified) (an. 14.29). He is resolute and energetically pursues learning, 
showing none of the laziness of Zaiwo, a student who often merited Confucius’ 
censure and whom Confucius once described as both “rotted wood” and “dried 
excrement” (an. 5.10). These are but a few examples of the many contrasts that the 
analects implicitly draw between Yan Hui and his peers. These contrasts mark Yan 
Hui as a kind of exception to the human foibles to which Confucius’ students are 
prey. 
The picture of the relationship between Confucius and his students that emerges 
in the analects is one that manifests features recognizable to anyone who has spent 
much time teaching. It is a relationship that affords moments of great affection 
and reward yet these are equally matched by moments of frustration, challenge, 
and conflict. Yan Hui is an exception in this regard as well. For, by Confucius’ own 
account, Yan Hui never disagrees with him: “Hui is of no help to me, for he does 
not disagree with anything I say” (an. 11.4). If he frustrates Confucius – it seems 
that he may if Confucius’ claim that Yan Hui is of “no help” is any indication – it 
is a comparably mild sort of frustration. Insofar as the descriptions of Yan Hui in 
the analects are comparable in function to the descriptions of other students, that is, 
insofar as they at least partially serve a biographical function, the view that Yan Hui’s 
is a countenance without much color is borne out.
Confucius makes a few remarks regarding Yan Hui that both confirm certain 
dullness in Yan Hui’s personality and begin to reconcile that dullness with the exalted 
position in Confucius’ affections that Yan Hui holds. Perhaps the most telling passage 
is one in which Confucius describes his own curiosity regarding Yan Hui’s mild mien:
The master said: “I can talk to Hui all day and, as though he were 
stupid, he will not disagree with me. Yet when he withdraws 
from my presence and I witness his private actions, [I see that] he 
manifests what I have been saying. Hui is clearly not stupid” (an. 
2.9).
This passage is extraordinary on a number of counts. It shows a rarely seen 
side of Confucius. Here he is bemused, the skill with which he typically “reads” the 
character of others having apparently failed him. He has clearly entertained doubts 
about Yan Hui’s abilities, yet whatever these doubts, they are matched by a suspicion 
that something has eluded him. Thus Confucius observes Yan Hui in secret in order 
to see what an unguarded Yan Hui is like. That Confucius is drawn to watch his 
student, acting with what one must imagine as a degree of stealth, likewise indicates 
another side of Yan Hui’s own character: he is, in some way, mysterious, even to his 
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teacher. That his teacher sees fit to report his secret observations furthermore suggests 
that the suspicion that Yan Hui is stupid is not limited to Confucius alone. Were it 
only Confucius who found Yan Hui puzzling, one would not expect Confucius to 
feel a need to report his findings to others. This passage thus reveals a seemingly 
paradoxical conclusion regarding Yan Hui’s character and personality: he is both 
what he seems and more than what he seems. He is an insipid figure and yet in his 
very lack of flavor resides a skillfulness and colorfulness that is at once consistent with 
Confucius’ counsel and mysterious. To resolve some of this mystery, it is necessary to 
return to the attribute of Yan Hui’s character, his goodness, which the analects most 
clearly define.
The Empty Man
Yan Hui is dull and he is also good. That he is both, however, is more than a 
simple coincidence. In a study on the “Chinese notion of ‘blandness,’” François 
Jullien argues that blandness – whether it be manifest in art, food, or individual 
human beings – is a “virtue.” Regarding the rich potential of the bland, it is possible 
not only to reconcile Yan Hui’s dull character with his goodness, but to show how his 
comparable plainness makes his goodness possible and, by extension, show just why 
he so endears himself to Confucius.
It is at this point we need to take a detour into the cosmology of taste in order 
to grasp the notion of blandness in the deeper meaning in the Chinese Confucian 
tradition. The Chinese tradition has a lot of fives: five tones, five colors, five direction, 
five elements, and five flavors, five virtues. The model of the five elements is one of the 
unchanging laws that bring s order to the manifestation of life. The elements found in 
cuisine that balances the five flavors, in paintings that incorporate the five associated 
colors, and in the system of music embodied in the five note scale. These ideas were 
used to govern and infuse political process with wisdom. The five elements allow the 
medical practitioner to diagnose and treat the respiratory chi.
Essentially, the five elements describe interrelationship of nature. The circular 
arrange is a creative cycle wood creates fire, fire created metal creates water, and 
water creates wood. The cycle is also known as a mother child relationship, a critical 
understanding of the rank of the Confucius paternal hierarchy of relation, father- 
son, etc. There is another system in the elements known as k’o or control cycle. This 
is a pattern of polar balance in which wood controls earth, earth controls water, water 
controls fire, fire controls metal and metal controls wood without the control the 
harmony movement of elements may be come excessive and overflow, k’o keeps 
of the balance of yin/yang. The movement of the elements: wood is expanding 
movement, fire, upward movement, earth downward movement, metal inward 
movement and water downward movement. The principal involved in these patterns 
and are inextricable from life in particularly seasonal and plant life these patterns 
are observed and the cycles manifests the symbolic meaning of the changes in the 
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cosmology respiratory of chi, hence the state model of the elements to a dynamic 
model. There are times of growth which an upward movement and a upsurge of 
activity as living things unfold according the shi, the power, the potency, the more 
of the inherent measure of the plants solar economy (A. Lingus), their markers of 
closing and storing, rest travel downward into depths, stillness, and transitions and 
upsurges. It is with these rhythms of life space time movement cycle that are taken 
symbolically with all its diffusion and suffusion with its contextual variants. 
The Chinese live close to the soil as the Greek agricultural observe the patterns 
the cycle is self-perpetuating resulting an unceasing transformation of life as the 
rhythms of the vegetative show itself in terms of the appearance and withdrawal of 
the vegetative life force. We find an expansion of light (yang) spring/summer and a 
contraction of light with the rising of the dark yin into autumn and coming to rest 
in winters.
The elements are given birth through the yin/yang and their flavors associate 
with each element, wood/sour, fire/bitter, earth/sweet, metal/pungent, water/salty. 
It would seem without too much work one can see the synesthetic dimension, the 
kinesthetic and perhaps even Heidegger was inspired. However, with the specter of 
Prometheus/Heidegger only gives us ontology of perspiration rather than a truly 
different order of thought produced from respiration / perspiration. As the associative 
symbols of China show that one of task of the elements was caring for earth.
As Confucius’ covert observations of Yan Hui demonstrate, the bland has about it 
an air of mystery. It appears to conceal as much as it reveals. Unlike Confucius’ other 
students who are readily known by their words and responses to events, knowing 
Yan Hui requires a resort to other measures for he displays no marked features. This 
absence of display is itself, however, what uniquely marks Yan Hui. He is, one who is 
“full yet appears to be empty” (an. 8.5). Being bland in character is, in some measure, 
to withhold oneself and be modestly sparing in personality. 
As a harmonious relationship between diverse qualities or 
capabilities, blandness expresses an optimal and discrete 
equilibrium in which no one quality manifests itself in such a 
way as to exclude another – and so where all qualities may сoexist 
simultaneously and manifest themselves appropriately according 
to the diversity of the circumstances.6
I should note that while Jullien has developed insight he seems somewhat 
paralyzed by the French semiotic who wish to regard China/ eat as having non-
mutually understood or any cross fertilization. In fact he continues the myth or 
absolute otherness. Clearly one example that should be noted among many others 
is Adam Smith’s notion of sympathy, used to name the Confucius character for 
relationship as sympathy. Smith, a student of Quetelet who was known as the 
6 Jullien, F.; Parkes, G. The Chinese Notion of “Blandness” as a Virtue: A Preliminary Outline. 
Philosophy East and West.43.1 (Jan 1, 1993): 108.
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Confucius of Europe, on the other hand lassie faire was interpreted as non-action. To 
be bland , and I think the word mute better illuminates what Jullien was getting at, is 
not to lack personality but to assiduously hold oneself in balance. It is to be insipid 
not for want of a defining character, but as a means to assert a character that invites 
determination.
The virtue of the bland rests in its capacity to lie open, to be both adaptive and 
opportunistic. Seen in this manner, the contrast between Yan Hui’s dullness and 
the colorful foibles of Confucius’ other students assume a significance beyond a 
contrast in personalities. The reactions and behaviors of Confucius’ other students 
are, in many ways, predictable. Owing to the color of their characters, their ability to 
succeed in a variety of endeavors can be anticipated with some confidence.
In Confucian tradition, etiquette or propriety (li) are the specific practices that 
regulate behaviors, but it originates from the emotions of human heart. When asked 
about etiquette, Confucius explained, it is the business of laying on the colors (the 
preparation of) the plain ground.” When asked what the meaning of this passage 
is – the pretty dimples in her artful smile the well-defined black and white of her eye.
The master said the business of laying on the colors follows the plain ground 
ceremonies then are a subsequent thing. “The master said it is shang who can bring out 
my meaning. Now I can begin to talk about the odes with him.” This passage gives us 
additional insight into the Confucian Chinese traditions. The odes serve to stimulate 
the mind for purposes of self-cultivation, and teaching the art of companionship; how 
to moderate the feeling and furthering one’s duty to one’s father and to the prince.
Jullien defines blandness or the plain ground as the moment at which to elements 
stands not in opposition, but rather, abide within the plentitude, as the undifferentiated 
foundation of all things. In order to find an apt comparative with today’s global world 
we should point to architecture is the visible aesthetic of sociology. Virillo indicates 
that architecture will continue to exist, but in the state of disappearance, where 
disappearance does not mean eliminated. This allows for the continuous and bland as 
it relates to the Chinese thought and aesthetic of “dan” meaning, dull, stupid, insipid, 
which is a translation of Jullien concept of fadeur – fade.
All landscapes blend together and assimilate each other. Architecture opens up 
the possibility for transformation and operation, again, as clearing. In describing 
the Nordic environment, Christian Norberg-Schultz distinguishes landscapes as 
incomprehensible and classical clearings over a comprehensive Euclidean whole, 
noting a incompleteness that suffuses into landforms. While open repetition manifest 
the environment as given. The clearing complements that which is missing  – 
seriality and repetition within a neutral, but not pure, material field which allow 
the displacement and evaluation accepted conditions of connecting, seaming, and 
jointing. Within any contextual situation there is the potential for supplementation/ 
augmentation promoting a quivering stability ultimately coalescing in a state 
of blandness. A dynamic and oscillating equilibrium is achieved through pure 
potentiality embodied in this process augmentation. Inherent to such processes 
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of design production there is inexhaustible potential to promote appropriation in 
unpredictable and dynamic ways.
Within the Western civilization way, blandness is understood as a lack, an 
undesirable absence of particular differentiated things. Positive in the East in Daoism 
and Confucian blandness/ muteness comprises balance and the unnamable union of 
all potential values. Is this integrated difference of the phenomenological ur-modal? 
(Mickunas).
Etiquette is just like the color white in service of other colors to become prominent. 
Etiquette if understood as drawing/ or drawing out is then it colorless (not a color in 
Chinese phrasing). White and colors emerge for real beauty to emerge. Etiquette is used 
to express the emotions and feelings appropriately. Therefore Confucian regulation of 
emotions of ups and downs is the use of etiquette on exterior forms and it also controls 
emotions by transforming interior feelings by a process of reflection. 
It is important to note that Confucius viewed the “cause” of emotions are external 
things, objects, or persons. Confucius explains: “all the modulations of the voice arise 
from the mind, and the various affections of the mind are produced by things. The 
affections thus produced are manifested in the sounds that are uttered (li ji, yue ji). For 
Confucius, music is not merely a human art but a common speech for all intelligence 
in the universe. Therefore Confucius indicates that ceremonies become the eyes of 
men as a delicate graceful and expressive mode of communication. The visible is in 
the ceremonies and the music is the invisible spiritual agency (liki, bk xvii, sect. v, 19).
Yan Hui shows that muteness is both a part of emotional restraint and 
comparable to the Tao, as a translucent white, subtly of taste which comprise an 
undifferentiating plainness allowing the unfolding of the colorful, flavorful and tonal 
manifesting through human activity in terms of things within the environment. This 
is of utmost importance to Confucius and an important element for us to understand 
the depth and mystery of Yan Hui. Musis is the hidden side of affective orientation, 
the silent vectors of forces of rhythm, a feeling of pulsation. For Confucius the pulses 
are a myriad of sound and vibration. The silent vectors are embodied in the universe 
in the concrete world of elemental cosmology endowed with their own tempo. (This 
is not the vitalism of the West, nor the vital élan of Bergson. 
Because of his dull aspect, Yan Hui is a character at once obvious and mysterious, 
and there is a sense in which he must ever remain unknown. What he might have been 
lies on an unreachable horizon of possibilities only dimly glimpsed. That the loss of 
Yan Hui strikes Confucius with such force is bound up with both the obvious and 
the mysterious. He sees Yan Hui’s skill and, in that sense, knows and appreciates the 
character of the companion he has lost. Yet the nature of Yan Hui’s skill is such that 
it is too easy to simply attribute Confucius’ grief to the loss of a known and beloved 
student. Yan Hui is not, or not simply, a young man whose character promised great 
achievements. His death represents, for Confucius, possibilities unrealized, but these 
are no ordinary possibilities. For what makes Yan Hui unique and his death uniquely 
painful is not that he is known but that he is unknown. What he offers is unfamiliar 
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and unpredictable, even to the sage Confucius. Unlike that of his other students, Yan 
Hui’s character promises to show Confucius something he has never seen before. 
Thus Confucius rues not what he knew Yan Hui would become but that he could 
not know what Yan Hui would become. And Yan Hui’s death ensured that he would 
never know. It may be of value to understand that Yan Hui’s name, pictographically 
may be interpreted as the ability to see both the past and future with discernment. 
Perhaps the uniqueness of Yan Hui offering the unfamiliar and unpredictable is 
based on facing the unfamiliar and unpredictable. Whereas Confucius looks to past 
as his only counsel, it might serve us well to understand the body schema of Chinese 
and reverse their temporal orientation compared to the West. The front is the past 
and the future is behind.
The Confucius Who Never Was
To say that identity is constructed in the patterns and interactions of relations 
with others is to acknowledge that who I am and can be is always embedded in a set 
of circumstances that are changeable. The death of Yan Hui serves as a dramatic and 
final rupture in the relation between Yan Hui and Confucius. Confucius claims to 
be destroyed by it and, in a very real sense, he is correct. For insofar as his relation 
with Yan Hui defines and circumscribes the character of Confucius, there is a certain 
“Confucius” who can no longer be. It is in this sense, Confucius’ expressions of grief 
are indicative of one who has lost his wits. Confucius’ behavior following Yan Hui’s 
death makes no sense, coming as it does from a man remarkable in his ability to 
navigate his way, resiliently and resolutely, in the chaotic landscape of his time. To 
claim that Confucius’ expressions of grief make no sense is not, however, to say that 
there is no sense to be made here. For in their lack of sense, there is significance.
Confucius’ wailing and protestations in part function to force the recognition 
that immediate grief is, in many ways, unspeakable. The “language” of grief mirrors 
its source. Rooted in loss and privation, grief’s most fitting expression is aphasia. 
Just as the habitual and familiar patterns of relation are ruptured by death, so too do 
the habitual and familiar patterns of speech abandon the bereaved. One’s tongue is 
caught and the language in which one lives cannot match the raw facticity of death. 
Confucius weeps and, pressed to explain, he seems to suggest that this is all he can 
do given the circumstance. His absence of self-awareness, evident in his asking, “Am 
I?” bespeaks confusion. His response to his students’ tacit query bespeaks a defiant 
refusal of explanation. “What is there to explain? In what language would I explain 
it? Yan Hui is dead,” he seems to say. Confucius’ reaction to this loss appears to 
be, “unpremeditated” and “largely ungoverned by any ordinary awareness of the 
purposiveness and meaning attached to actions.”7 It is reaction unmediated by a 
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cognitive process by which it could be justified or adequately explained. Its language 
is as significant for what it cannot say as for what it does. Confucius does not speak 
in his usual manner because he cannot. For Confucius the colorless /colorful binary 
is shrouded in a type of silence or mystery. Words fail him. The rupture blocks his 
respiration and he cannot breathe into the word, he has lost his way /orientation. 
Yan Hui is, Confucius claims, the only student who “listens with persistent 
attention” (an. 9.20) and he is the only one whom Confucius will describe as “eager 
for learning” (an. 6.3). While these are features that would presumably please any 
teacher, there is a sense in which they only add to the mystery of Yan Hui’s character. 
For Yan Hui’s manner of engaging his teacher is apparently to adopt a posture of 
placid receptivity. He does not disagree and thus he does not explicitly challenge. Yet 
in his agreeable attention resides an implicit challenge.
As a student, Yan Hui is, a “paradox.”8 He is of no help and appears to be stupid 
because he denies Confucius “the incitement that a less talented disciple, such as Zigong 
(an. 3.8) offers by his repeated questions.”9 Yan Hui listens and heeds. Indeed, he 
requires but the “barest indication” of Confucius’ meaning in order to appropriate and 
exploit what he is offered.10 Confucius observes this and recognizes its power. When 
Zigong is loath to compare himself to Yan Hui because Yan Hui “is able to hear one 
thing and understand ten,” Confucius matter-of-factly sympathizes (an. 5.9). “You are 
not as good as he,” Confucius says, “neither you nor I are as good as he.” The challenge 
that Yan Hui poses is, like his character, an admixture of the obvious and the subtle. 
He will not disagree nor will he engage Confucius in agonistic dialogue. Instead, he will 
absorb and he will instantiate, his open and passive demeanor an implicit challenge to 
Confucius not to defend or clarify his teachings but to teach more. 
The Confucius who teaches Yan Hui cannot be the same Confucius who teaches 
Zigong and the other students. With Yan Hui, Confucius is called to be both more 
and less than he is with his other students. He must be more, for Yan Hui’s skill 
places the relation beyond ready predictability. What Yan Hui does or will do with 
Confucius’ instruction admits a mystery not evident in Confucius’ relationships 
with his other pupils. Thus it is the teacher as well as the student who is faced with 
the unfamiliar and novel, who is called to respond fruitfully to the circumstances 
offered by a new terrain. However, Confucius is also less in this relationship. He and 
Yan Hui enjoy the repose of an easy communication in which an excess of words is 
unnecessary. Yan Hui’s skill as a student and Confucius’ skill as a teacher conspire to 
produce a mutual understanding “so complete,” “that it suppresses the dialogue.”11 
The vocabulary of instruction so vital to Confucius’ activity with others can here give 
8 Jullien, F.; Parkes, G. The Chinese Notion of “Blandness” as a Virtue: A Preliminary Outline. 
Philosophy East and West.43.1 (Jan 1, 1993): 108.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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way to an appreciative and pregnant silence in which “teacher” and “student” dissolve 
into Confucius and Yan Hui, each enjoying the vista that their companionship and 
collaboration opens up.
Confucius is, thus, in this relationship something he cannot otherwise be. The 
Confucius here displayed is at his most efficacious as a teacher. He may instruct with a 
confidence that he is understood. He may speak sparingly and trust that his words are 
sufficient. Above all, he can enjoy his own bemusement in the mystery of Yan Hui and 
the way in which Yan Hui’s character imbues Confucius himself with mystery. What 
might a teacher with such a student become? What might their collaboration produce 
in the world? Confucius is confident of the path he traverses and he is confident in 
Yan Hui’s skill, but these are questions he cannot answer for he does not and cannot 
know. They lie on a horizon of possibility that can only be accessed by Confucius and 
Yan Hui together. With Yan Hui’s death, this horizon, dimly glimpsed, recedes from 
view and the Confucius who could travel there is destroyed.
When Confucius grieves, he appears to his students to have abandoned his usual 
self-command, but that Confucius is “not himself” is unsurprising. Yan Hui’s death 
opens a rupture in Confucius’ identity. He cannot, in this circumstance, be who 
he was. His response is uncharacteristic because it cannot be otherwise. He is as a 
man on a landscape suddenly bereft of a marker by which he defines his course. He 
is disoriented, unsure of his position, lost. That he should weep without restraint 
indicates that he appreciates the significance of what he has lost.
The grief that results from loss in this context cannot be counted a failure of will 
or of understanding. To care for another in the way that Confucius suggests and to 
admit another formative function in the construction of my identity entails a tacit 
rejection of the notion that every individual will and must die alone. It is to pledge 
myself and my well-being to another by saying, in essence, “you will take me out when 
you go.” Yet Confucius’ counsel is not an endorsement of unquestioning or untutored 
sorrow, for it also requires that we combat an ordinary species of vulnerability. It 
requires a valorized vulnerability in which I stand ready to consummate the value of 
my relations to others by being open to injury. To stand thus is to know the potential 
cost of my affections and deem them worth it. It is to self-consciously bare my neck 
to the stinging blade of loss.
Confucius even after Yan Hui death still held closely to the notion, the expression 
of enjoyment with being licentious, and of grief without being hurtfully excessive. 
The notion that when joy anger, sorrow and pleasure have not yet arisen, it is called 
change, equilibrium, centrality, meaning when they arise in an appropriate levels, it 
is called harmony and offers happiness brings pleasure to the body, grief sharpened 
the mind. 
The rupture in his loss of control and his speechless is a trauma .a new style a 
new opportunity for Confucius. The coherent deformation opens the a style just as 
the calligrapher point his brush over the flat surface and in one movement makes a 
continuous line without lifting from the surface This is the spontaneous, the “wu-
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wei of action” (of no action). The very movement of the calligraphy requires breath 
control while exhaling, the point of the brush initiates its explosive destiny.
The dead body lacks in its primal motility. The dead are excluded from the 
community. In the Husserlian sense breathing is part of the I can, even when I am 
not voluntarily controlling my breath it is simply an allowing to breathe freely. The 
kinesthetic breathing is more than the respiratory but allows the torso to respond to 
the world in a certain way in which the pulsation of one’s motility and the pulsation 
of things couples with body movement. This pulsation named (shi) potential is the 
disposition (the more) of all living between and in-between the impulse of pure 
transitions. 
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